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Classification is regarded by some as a very elementary and a
very barren scientific device or method. For those who attach
most importance to applied science, and to the achievement of
practical ends, classification seems a dry and' futile procedure.
For those likewise who insist upon the importance of moral
standards and purposes, the brutally empirical inductive process
of classification seems inhuman, possibly even anti-social.
That classification is an elementary task of science, in the sense
of occurring early in the whole scientific process, no one could
deny, albeit only some one who has had immediate and serious
experience in classification can appreciate the advanced problems,
both of theory and of application, which can be encountered
therein. From the point of view of human interest, something
would depend upon what is being classified, whether pearls or
potatoes, for example, although it would seem to be an implied
tenet of pure science that no knowledge of the universe is without
value and that we are not able to say beforehand how important
a given piece of knowledge will turn out to be. As for whether
classification is fruitless, this likewise would seem to turn wholly
upon the use to which it is put. Even such a practical and poten-
tially moral procedure as exhortation may be directed to un-
important or even vicious ends; perhaps a method not inherently
vicious, but merely neutral, may be devoted to useful ends.
Classification, then, seems to promise valuable results when
applied to socially important subject-matter, as a means to the
end of dealing more effectively therewith, as a step in the process
of manipulating that subject-matter to important social ends.
Indeed, any student who has been trained at all in general scientific
method, or in the method and technique of any special science
today, would be likely to turn the statement around. He would
insist that no fruitful manipulation of any body of subject-matter,
no intellectual mastery of any given body of data, and no effective



















































































































CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 213
entities involved is possible without full use of that elementary
but indispensable procedure of classification.
As a problem of pure scientific method, there is, perhaps, no
call for this discussion here. It is inserted, however, not merely
with such general thoughts in mind, but because there seems to
be a great need today to invoke the process of analysis and
classification in the study of international organization, including,
of course, international law in so far as the latter may be involved
therein, and because it seems desirable to call attention to that
need and make a tentative effort toward satisfying it. The field
of international organization has been characterized recently,
probably with considerable accuracy, as a jungle or a "wilder-
ness."1 If this be a sound indictment, it is because writers on the
subjects included within the field either have not been able or
have not sufficiently tried to classify the data therein and bring
order out of the chaos. They have approached the study without
sufficient equipment in analytical political science, with too strong
a legalistic bias, or too strong social emotions, or they have
neglected the task because too much preoccupied with mere
descriptive and historical treatment. It is time these defects were
remedied.2
II
It has become quite common today to speak of "international
organization," or even "international government," in the ab-
stract, or by the use of the generic term. Reference is made even
to the international organization or the existing international
organization, as though there were one great and only one single
system of international organization in the world today. From
here it is but a short step, in ideas at least, to a concept of the
world government and the world state.
In a measure, this is a gain, in contrast to the earlier quite
literal and unreflective reference to existing specific concrete
international institutions—the Conference of London, the German-
American Claims Commission, the Danube Commission, or what
not. The emergence of the concept of international organization
1
 P. C. Jessup, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Octo-
ber, 1932), p. 910.
2
 Responsibility for the confusion prevailing in the field must be shared with the
scientists by the practitioners, who have been even more muddle-headed than the


















































































































2 1 4 THE AMEBICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
as such, above the specific cases or embodiments thereof, consti-
tutes a step in advance—indeed one of the most important in the
history of political science.3
This development has, however, accentuated somewhat, or at
least coincided with, the neglect of analysis and classification
already referred to. Just as many observers have continued to
deal with "international organizations" without much attempt
at grouping these institutions in any order or system, so others
have talked of "international organization" without subdividing
that concept usefully or rationally into its component parts. This
latter was not a necessary consequence of the employment of the
generic term, for its users might well pass on to further analysis
of its content; but it has in fact occurred in some quarters.
The greatest provocation for these comments, however, and the
chief basis of this brief study of the way out of the situation, will
be found in four documents, not by any means unknown to
students of international organization, but not, it seems, ade-
quately exploited hitherto in this connection. These are (1) the
Handbook of International Organizations, compiled by the Inter-
national Bureaux Section of the Secretariat of the League of
Nations, and published by the League,4 (2) the list of Organiza-
tions and Commissions of the League of Nations,5 (3) the Staff List
of the Secretariat,6 and (4) the similar List of the Permanent Staff
of the International Labor Office,7 all published likewise by the
League. To these might be added other documentary materials,8
1
 On these matters, see brief discussion in E. C. Mower, International Government
(1931), p. 3.
• League of Nations, Handbook of International Organizations, 1929. A supple-
ment to the Handbook was published in 1931, and there is published every three
months a Quarterly Bulletin of Information on the Work of International Organiza-
tions. These are to be understood as forming part of the material in the Handbook,
although the Quarterly Bulletin gives little data on the official organizations or,
particularly, upon their organization (for the distinction between the official and
unofficial organizations, see below, near note 45).
• In League of Nations, Monthly Summary, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (February, 1934),
p. 49.
• In League of Nations, Official Journal, XIV Year, No. 10, Part II (October,
1933), p. 1259.
7
 In same, p. 1280.
• Such as the budget of the League, in same, p. 1188, and the staff list of the
Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in Ninth Annual Report
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Publications of the Permanent Court


















































































































CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 215
but these alone would constitute a sufficient basis for the study
in hand. When it is discovered that neither the League itself nor
the Labor Office appears in the Handbook,9 that the classification
of public organizations used therein results in elevating three
quite peculiar institutions to first place in the list,10 and that in the
main list are enumerated indiscriminately, and all on the same
footing, such disparate institutions as (in order named) the Inter-
national Institute of Agriculture, the International Conference on
Private Law Affecting Air Questions, the International Technical
Committee of Legal Experts on Air Questions, and the Permanent
Court of Arbitration,11 the incitement to sound analysis and classi-
fication is all the more acute.
in
A question must be raised at the outset concerning the nature
and formal relations of any international "organization" which it
is proposed to include. What is meant by an organization in this
sense? What tests define its existence or non-existence, its distinct
existence from its existence as, so to speak, part of something else?
An organization in the sense in which the term is here used—
waiving closer examination of the "international" element for the
moment—consists fundamentally of an association or union of
nations established or recognized by them for the purpose of
realizing a common end. Such an association or union is partly
subjective and partly objective in character; it may be very loose
or very close in degree, but while it never amounts to a fusing of
the two states in a physical sense, yet something more is involved
than a mere abstract or imaginary union. It seems clear also that
a mere factual community of interest between two states is not
enough to satisfy the concept; recognition and acceptance of that
situation is needed to bring the phenomenon over into the field of
international law and cooperation, although any action of creating
an international organization must almost certainly rest upon
such preexisting community of interest.12
9
 They are, of course, intentionally omitted (for reasons given in Handbook, p.
5), but the result on the picture of existing international organizations is none the
less striking.
10
 Handbook, p. 9. See also discussion below, near note 75.
u
 Handbook, p. 9.
1!
 For further discussion of the relation between the factual and legal elements of
the situation, see below, note 54. By the definition given, we are in effect discussing


















































































































216 THE AMEBICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE BEVIEW
On the other hand, the end to be attained may be merely the
common support of a given principle or the maintenance of a
position of inaction, rather than the taking of any overt action,
though loyalty to any particular ideal or doctrine is almost certain
to emerge in the form of outward activity.13 Similarly, the union
may attempt to operate through the member-states and their
agents rather than through any agents of its own; or, if an attempt
is made to set up such agents, they may consist of one individual
who in turn may be a national of one of the members or not, or of
numerous individuals selected by and representing the members
or selected on other grounds and of any nationality.14 In any case,
the union of states is the essential element in the organization,
and the agency, which is sometimes confused with the organization
itself, and perhaps entitled to be so regarded in a secondary and
which is present in all international organization. This aspect of the situation will
































 For an example of a union professing to be formed primarily for the support
of a principle, see the so-called Holy Alliance (of 1815): British and Foreign State
Papers, Vol. Ill, p. 211. The way in which this position resulted in overt action is
well known.
14
 This problem has been very acute recently in connection with the personnel
of the League assigned to administrative work. See League of Nations, Official
Journal, Special Supplement No. 88, p. 51, etc. On the problem in general, see
N. L. Hill, International Administration (1931), p. 201. One type of union of states,
the alliance, traditionally possesses no common agency for its operation. For this



















































































































CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL OBGANIZATIONS 217
derived sense, is strictly only the expression, or even merely the
tool, thereof.
It would necessarily follow that such a union, to be considered
as "an international organization," must be distinct from any
other such union, and still more that a distinct international
agency, in order to be considered in this light, must be the sole
agency of its supporting union. That is to say, if a given union is
found to consist both in international law and in fact, by the
terms of its constitution and the actual practice of its members,
of the same states which make up another union (sic), it seems
impossible to consider that there are two distinct organizations
present; if the constitutional documents hold that there is identity
of membership, and the states act upon this basis, it seems erro-
neous to speak otherwise because of a plurality of such documents
or divergent systems of administrative agencies or instrumentali-
ties.16 Or if a given agency is but one of two or more agencies main-
tained by the same union, it would be impossible to consider that
agency (or the union supporting it) as a distinct organization, in
addition to the other agencies maintained by that union (or its
union anything beyond the union supporting all those agencies
taken together). The converse of these propositions would likewise
hold good; that is, where diversities of union membership are
found, there are not one but several organizations present. In cases
where the same agency is supported and utilized by two or more
unions,16 there would likewise seem to be two or more organizations
present in spite of the unity of the agency, the union of the states
in law and fact being fundamental as a criterion, rather than the
agency. This would all be particularly important if a numerical
count of existing international organizations were to be attempted,
but it is also important in forming any picture of what organiza-
tions exist, and of the relations existing among them.
The foregoing analysis places emphasis upon the existence and
composition of the international union and, in an incidental way,
15
 Thus, a stipulation of identity not lived up to in practice would not produce
identity nor an identity of participants in two distinct legal systems. The mere fact
that the same states belong to two unions is not decisive if they belong under dis-
tinct legal documents which define distinct memberships. Identity of subject-matter
would count still less.
11
 For example, the Assembly of the League of Nations is used by the League,
the Labor Organization, and the union of the Permanent Court of International


















































































































218 THE AMEBICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
upon the existence and activity of the agency of the union. Would
not attention to the purely legal element in the situation effect an
economy of effort and also greater accuracy? As has been sug-
gested, an interstate agreement must exist at the bottom of all
such unions, providing for its existence and operation. Should not
the principal attention be devoted to this agreement itself? And
would that not be the best way to clarify and correct certain
erroneous ideas sometimes held concerning such institutions?17
The answer seems to be in the negative. Such unions may exist,
not indeed without any such interstate agreement, but without
any single formal documentary constitution,18 or with constitutions
which give very inadequate ideas of their activities,19 and in such
cases the suggested test would be misleading. Many interstate
agreements exist, on the other hand, which do not create any inter-
national organization except in the most elementary sense (in the
sense in which every treaty, and indeed every accepted rule of even
common international law, creates such organization), and here
such a test is insufficient. What is the main point, however, is that
even where such institutions exist upon the basis of a formal
constitution, it is not the legal elements in the situation, the mutual
rights and obligations of the parties, much less the text expressing
that legal element, that constitutes the organization, but the union
of states, partly juristic but also largely practical in nature. It is
not what the organization is constitutionally and legally author-
ized to do, or even obligated to do, but what it actually does, that
determines its real nature and significance.
What does this mean, however, for the problem of overlapping
or divergent memberships? Or what of the statement that two
unions of identical membership are really one, except in cases
where two distinct constitutions exist, defining and serving two
distinct purposes? It seems that here also the importance of the
17
 For examples of such legalistic treatment, see A. P. Fachiri, Permanent Court
of International Justice (2nd ed., 1932). This is to be distinguished from treatment of
the legalistic aspect of international unions as, frankly, but one aspect thereof, as in
J. Ray, Commentaire du Fade de la SodUi des Nations (1930).
18
 Such was the situation of the Pan-American Union prior to 1928. See United
States Department of State, Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Sixth
International Conference of American States (1928), pp. 3-8; such, for that matter, is
the situation still, failing ratification of the Convention of 1928.
19
 Such seems to be true of the League today. See amount of space given in W.
Schticking and H. Wehberg, Satzung des Volkerbundes (3rd ed., 1931), to League


















































































































CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2 1 9
text is, at least, less than might be supposed. Waiving the case
where states seem to have been received into an organization con-
trary to the text of the constitution,20 there are numerous other
cases where non-members, in the strict legal sense, participate
actively in the organization,21 and also cases where legal members
do not "participate actively.22 The bare legalistic picture of the
situation is hardly adequate here. So when it is felt that two unions
of identical membership are distinct when they have distinct con-
stitutions, the impression seems to be sound, not merely because
of the distinctness of the legal texts, but because of the distinctness
of the systems of practical cooperation also. Indeed, the very
member states might be regarded as different member states in
their capacities as participants in the two divergent systems.23
Finally, the nature of the concept of "membership" in any such
organization deserves some attention. Primarily, it is an element
on the subjective, formal, legalistic side of the problem: those
states are "members" which are nominally so regarded by their
fellow-members, in accordance with the legal requirements for
membership. But on the more objective side, things may look very
different: the only sense in which certain states may seem to belong
to a given organization lies in the fact that they are to some
extent controlled thereby, or, if the other side of the situation is
examined, actual control of the organization may turn out to be
vested in a few members,24 or, even where the law on control
coincides with the law on membership, the financial control may
rest in limited hands,25or the actual influence in the determination
of policy and activity on the part of the organization may be con-
10
 See the "admission" of Germany and other states to the International Labor
Organization in 1919. Socie'te' des Nations, Conference Internationale du Travail,
Premiere Session Annuelle, 1920, pp. 15, 21, 25.
11
 For the most notable case, of course, see U. P. Hubbard, Cooperation of the
United States with the League of Nations (1931).
11
 On inactivity of some League member-states, see W. H. Kelchner, Latin Amer-
ican Relations with the League of Nations (1929), p. 138.
" Thus Germany as a member-state of the League is a very different juristic
entity from Germany as a member-state of the Universal Postal Union.
M
 See provisions for predominant membership or control in the League (Cove-
nant, Art. IV) and the International Labor Organization (Constitution, Art. 393).
M
 See provisions in the International Institute of Agriculture Convention (Art.
X) and the provisions or facts concerning support of the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law, the International Educational Cinematographic
Institute, and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, in Handbook,


















































































































220 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE BEVIEW
centrated in a few powers. The problem is more or less analogous
to that of the nationality of a corporation below the level of the
state.26 The answer seems to be complicated, here as there. Nominal
legal and actual or practical conditions must both be taken into
account; as such, an organization possesses, ineluctably, two as-
pects, legal and factual, and inasmuch as these two may diverge
at any given moment, no certain and simple answer can be given
to the problem.
The documents referred to above contain many illustrations of
these propositions. Thus if it be agreed that not only does member-
ship in the League of Nations carry membership in the Inter-
national Labor Organization,27 and that this is the only way in
which membership therein can be acquired,28 and that loss of
League membership involves loss of Labor Organization member-
ship,29 it would seem that there really existed only one organiza-
tion, whatever it is to be called. The same might be said of the
International Health Organization,30 the Communications and
Transit Organization,31 and the Economic and Financial Organ-
ization,32 although here the possibilities of membership distinct
from League membership are even less than in the former case,
while the problem of the identity of the organization is a good
deal more complicated.33
Similarly, there are many cases where the "organizations"
listed are in effect not distinct international organizations at all,
but merely so many agencies of one supreme organization. It
would seem that this is true of all of the organizations listed in
the document entitled "Organizations and Commissions of the
League of Nations," and that this fact is attested by the con-
cluding phrase of that title.34 The same would seem to hold for all
» C. C. Hyde, International Law (1922), §794.
17
 Labor Organization Constitution, Art. 387.
28
 There being no provision in the Labor Constitution for selection of members.
See abcwe, note 20.
M
 A. matter on -which there nas aa yet \>een given no definite opinion. See M. O.
Hudson, "Opinion on Membership in the Labor Organization," in document cited
above (note 20), p. 211.
30
 On membership, see League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement
January, 1921, pp. 12, 15.
31
 Same, p. 14.
32
 Same, p. 13.
33
 See structural details in document cited above (note 5), pp. 50-56.
34


















































































































CLASSIFICATION OP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 221
the units listed under the Secretariat and Labor Office in the Staff
Lists and the Budget of the League.38
Where non-member states participate, upon the invitation or
with the consent of member states, in certain League activities
such as disarmament or health work, the situation seems to change,
and a new and distinct union comes into existence for the purpose
in hand. The members of one preexisting union join with non-
members to form another union. The result is a loose aggregate of
unions for various objects.36 Such, before the League was estab-
lished, was the situation—and still is the situation—in the field
of what is commonly called international administration (although
closer examination will reveal that not merely administrative, but
also legislative and judicial, or generic governmental, organization
and action were involved). In fact this is simply another, less
familiar, aspect of the problem of universality, so often discussed
in connection with the League:37 as long as each of the single
organizations is less than universal, all are likely to vary in
membership and constitute distinct unions, except for cases where
accidentally the members of different unions happen to be the
same.
The case of the Permanent Court of International Justice is
more complicated. It is legally possible for states to adhere to the
Statute of the Court without becoming members of the League,38
and at the present time one state is a "member" of the Court (in
this sense) while not a member of the League.39 Similarly, certain
states members of the League are not members of the Court.40
On the other hand, the League members, acting as such, elect the
judges and pay the bills of the Court, and certain other lines of
connection, historical and actual, may be traced between the two
institutions.41 On the whole, it seems that the Court must be
regarded as legally distinct (as it is independent in operation),
though largely integrated with the League structurally and prac-
tically.
* Documents cited above (note 6-8).
»• P. Guggenheim, Der Volkerbund (1932), pp. 60, 211, 272-273.
17
 League of Nations, Assembly, Records, Plenary, 1925, pp. 52, 54, and 1926, p.
52.
88
 Permanent Court of International Justice, Publications, Series D., No. 1, pp. 6,7.
" Brazil; same, Series E., No. 8, pp. 45, 49.
40
 Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru.
41


















































































































222 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
Among the many organizations listed in the Handbook, there
are some which seem to overlap in the same way, but this problem
is one which arises chiefly in connection with the League and has,
perhaps, been sufficiently illustrated already. The case where such
problems arise most extensively outside of the League is that of
the Pan American Union, whose many bureaus and commissions
and conferences rather closely duplicate the rambling League
system.42
IV
Two serious questions arise in connection with the international
character of the organizations under discussion. The first is a
query as to their national, or official national, character, and the
second a question as to the extent or degree of their international
character. These may be considered briefly at this point.
At bottom, any social "organization" must consist of a com-
bination of two or more individuals or groups of individuals, the
individual being the irreducible unit, but also a sufficiently self-
motivated unit for the purpose of social life. The organization
would be rendered international by the introduction of an inter-
national element in its composition.43 Now that element might be
introduced by the presence in the membership of two individuals
of divergent nationality; but would this satisfy the true test for
such an organization? Can an organization of two or more in-
dividuals or groups of individuals of divergent nationality be
properly regarded as an "international" organization?
To some extent, this is merely a verbal problem which requires
and deserves little attention; one might employ the appellation
"international organization" with at least reasonable literary
license to organizations made up merely of individuals of different
nationalities.44 The question involves more than this, however.
Is it logically sound to regard in that light such an organization?
Does such an organization really possess such a character? It is
« Pan American Union, Bulletin, April, 1930, April, 1931, April, 1932 (items by
the director-general, Dr. L. S. Rowe).
43
 Though not in its activity; thus a French school located in France but drawing
students in part from Italy would hardly rank as an international organization.
u
 The question of whether a "private" organization operating for pecuniary
profit should be included also arises. The fact that the organization earns, or even
seeks to earn, a financial profit seems to affect the situation in no way, any more than
operation at a loss would do. Various international organizations receive some


















































































































CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 223
not believed that it does. Unless an organization consists of two
or more states or nations as such,45 unless it depends for its action
upon the action of national states as units and pretends to act with
their authority, it is not called upon to satisfy the tests which
any such organization must meet, that is, respect for national
sovereignty, action by virtue of the operation of concordant
national sovereignties, and so on. This relieves it—the private
organization—of a great deal of responsibility, but by the same
token such an organization has no power over or among the states
as such, and this diminishes somewhat, if without entirely destroy-
ing, its importance. The other type of thing may be important,
but it is not international in the strict sense of the term.46
In other words, official international organizations are what is
here at issue.47 It seems doubtful whether the term should be
applied at all to the other sort of thing. By this test, the enormous
mass of organizations listed in the Handbook would simply drop
out of the reckoning. They might be regarded as unofficial world
organizations or private cosmopolitan organizations, and as such
very important for their services to humanity and their encourage-
ment of official international organization proper, and as deserving
attention and sympathetic understanding as such; but they are
not organizations of states or nations.48
Secondly, it would appear that some notice must be taken of
the fact that there is wide divergence among international organ-
*' Understanding by "state" an organized group of individuals over which no
other such group has authority not legally defeasible by the former at its discretion
on the ground of self-preservation.
" It should be added that the unofficial organizations are not envisaged by Art.
XXIV of the Covenant, relating to the unification of external organizations with the
League; nor was the International Bureaux Section at first expected to deal with
such organizations. That the Section turned to these organizations, and that they
now fill nineteen-twentieths of the space in the Handbook, is attributable to their
quantitative, if not qualitative, importance, and to a decision taken in 1921 in
recognition of this fact. League of Nations, Official Journal, II Year, No. 2 (March,
1921), p. 177.
47
 There exist, of course, a number of organizations wherein the elements are
mixed. Private organizations receive official approval, and even financial support.
Governments participate in what thus become semi-official organizations. Public
officials form organizations as—so to speak—individuals interested in certain work
(police work, legislation). See Handbook, pp. 143, 177-178, 37-38, 16. The classifica-
tion of certain specific organizations might be very difficult, but it would seem that
the facts are not such as to alter the general principles set forth above.
48


















































































































2 2 4 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
izations in point of the number of their members. In other words,
there are bilateral and multilateral organizations, or, as some
prefer, organizations bipartite and multipartite. Of how much
importance is this difference?
It would seem that in strict legal theory a bilateral union of
states is, after all, an international organization in the proper
meaning of that concept, and entitled to be classified as such.49
For various practical reasons, such organizations are omitted from
the Handbook, and it must be admitted that certain bilateral organ-
izations seem to be very narrow and peculiar in the circumstances
of their origin and traceable more to local conditions and reactions
than to factors such as would explain or justify international organ-
ization in general.60 But in a true juridical sense, this attitude
seems open to criticism. At the same time, the great multilateral
unions seem more significant both as to their foundations and their
potential services to the international community. The bilateral
unions cannot be entirely excluded, but must be regarded as less
important practically than the others.
(To be concluded in the next issue)
49
 Compare the International Joint Commission maintained by the United States
and Canada. United States Department of State, Register, 1932, p. 283.
*• See the International Water Commission, United States and Mexico, in same,
p. 285.
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